

School; and Dr. David Satcher, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The procla-

mation is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.

## Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Chancellor Franz Vranitzky of Austria

April 20, 1994

### Bosnia

Q. Mr. President, are the allies on board now for your new Bosnia policy—strategy?

*The President.* Well, I've talked to President Yeltsin and President Mitterrand today, and Prime Minister Chretien. And I have not talked to Chancellor Kohl or to Prime Minister Major today. I haven't been able to get them, but I talked to them in the last couple of days. And I'll have more to—they were all good conversations and I'll—as you know, I'm going to make a statement after I meet with Chancellor Vranitzky.

Q. Minister Kozyrev said that they are dead set against air strikes. Does that set you back in initiating the policy?

*The President.* I read his statement; I didn't quite read it that way. But I had a conversation with President Yeltsin, and I will report it when I go out and make my statement. I'll tell you what he said.

Q. One hundred and seven people have been injured in the last 24 hours in Gorazde. We understand 38 are dead. Do you think that this new policy will help ameliorate the situation? Will the Serbs now take heed?

*The President.* We'll see. I'm going to make a statement and answer questions about it.

### Richard Nixon

Q. Did you get a chance to talk to President Nixon's family?

*The President.* No, I talked to—actually, I talked to Billy Graham right after—he was on his way to the hospital right after he had his stroke. And I had—as soon as all this is over, I'm going to attempt to get in touch with one of his daughters at the hospital. I've been getting reports every hour or so for the last couple of days.

Q. How is he doing now? Is he—

*The President.* I think that's for them to say.

[At this point, one group of reporters left the room, and another group entered.]

### Bosnia

Q. Mr. President, what should Austria do concerning Bosnia?

*The President.* Excuse me?

Q. What should Austria do concerning the Bosnian crisis?

*The President.* Of course, that's partly for Austria to decide. But I think that all of us should be working toward doing whatever can be done to stop the aggression of the Serbs and to restore a diplomatic initiative that will actually work. It should be clear to everyone that this issue is not going to be solved ultimately on the battlefield. And the best thing that's happened in months and months was the agreement between the Croats and the Muslims, freely entered into, dealing with a lot of the very difficult issues between them. And I believe the same thing could be done with the Serbs, unless they believe that they can continue through aggression to win the territory. And their actions now are inconsistent with offers they themselves have put on the negotiating table just in the last month or two.

So we're going to do what we can to exert whatever pressure and to take whatever initiatives we can to restore a climate in which a decent and honorable agreement can be reached. And I hope that that would be the same policy that Austria would have.

Q. Mr. President, do the Russians agree with the United Nations position and the position of the NATO, the current one?

*The President.* Well, I think we have—there is a broad agreement on objectives. I had a good talk with President Yeltsin, but I believe, frankly, we have to wait and get the details all written out, you know, so that we see whether we're in complete accord. I'm hoping that

we will be. I felt very good about the telephone conversation I had with President Yeltsin.

I think—they're also very upset with the Serbs. They feel that they had a clear commitment to back out of Gorazde, not to endanger the U.N. forces there. And yesterday President Yeltsin made a very good statement about saying the Serbs should withdraw from Gorazde to a certain distance and that the U.N. forces should go back in. And my own view is that we have a chance to have a common policy.

NOTE: The exchange began at 4:42 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. In his remarks, he referred to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, French President François Mitterrand, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and evangelist Billy Graham. A tape was not available for verification of the content of this exchange.

## The President's News Conference

*April 20, 1994*

*The President.* Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to begin by saying that I want to join all the American people as Hillary and I pray for the health and the recovery of President Nixon. I want to again say how much I have appreciated the wise counsel he has given me on the question of Russia and many other issues since I have been President.

I spoke with a member of his family just a few moments ago, and I did speak with Reverend Billy Graham shortly after President Nixon was admitted to the hospital when Reverend Graham was on the way to the hospital. And I have nothing public to report about that, except to say that his condition remains serious, and I hope he will be in the prayers of all Americans.

Over the last several days, the situation in Gorazde has become increasingly grim. The Serb forces have broken their own truce agreements, persisted in brutal attacks on civilians, United Nations personnel, and NATO forces protecting those personnel. These events are clearly a setback for the momentum achieved in recent months. The NATO ultimatum brought a reprieve to Sarajevo: humanitarian routes were reopened, agreements between Muslims and Croats changed the balance of power on the ground and offered new diplomatic opportunity.

There are reports that the Serbs have released more U.N. personnel and returned heavy weapons seized from U.N. control near Sarajevo, and they are welcome. But the imperative now is not only to address the latest Serb trans-

gressions, it is to renew the momentum toward peace.

Let me be clear about our objective. Working with our allies, the Russians, and others, we must help the warring parties in Bosnia to reach a negotiated settlement. To do that, we must make the Serbs pay a higher price for continued violence so it will be in their own interests, more clearly, to return to the negotiating table. That is, after all, why we pushed for NATO's efforts to enforce a no-fly zone and the Sarajevo ultimatum and to provide close air support for U.N. forces who come under attack.

In pursuit of that policy, we must take further action. Therefore, the United States has today undertaken the following initiatives:

First, we are proposing to our NATO allies that we extend the approach used around Sarajevo to other safe areas, where any violations would be grounds for NATO attacks. I have insisted that NATO commit itself to achievable objectives. NATO's air power alone cannot prevent further Serb aggressions or advances or silence every gun. Any military expert will tell you that. But it can deny the Serbs the opportunity to shell safe areas with impunity.

Second, we will work with others to pursue tighter sanctions through stricter enforcements. The existing sanctions on Serbia have crippled Serbia's economy. In light of recent events, there must be no relief.

Third, we are taking other steps to relieve suffering and support the peace process. We are offering the United Nations assistance in addressing the humanitarian crisis that is now